I'm fine with electronic voting machines with the requirement that they also produce a printed paper trail so they can be audited in case something seems off. Electronic voting machines in California print to paper and your can validate that your paper printout matches before you submit it.
We have historical problems with the buying and persecution of voters because of their vote. An important part of the Brazilian system is the secret ballot.
It's secret here too, the paper copy is sealed and doesn't have your name in it. Nobody sees it and even if they were to check it after you leave they would not know it belonged to you.
Every machine prints the counts, has extensive information of how the voting went, and has several redundancies/checksums/etc in place to make it basically the kind of thing where, IF someone managed to break it in one place, everything else would become fucked up in one way or another, nothing would match, and everybody would know there is something off.
That's good. I wasn't trying to claim Brazil didn't have it, just that a good electronic voting machine system should have it. That sounds legit! For some reason lots of other people here don't seem to understand that a paper trail does not have to be identifiable.
Oh no, I get it, you were clearly not speaking maliciously/being prejudiced, that's why you're the one non-confrontational reply I've got in this thread LOL
The vast of majority of the thread simply can't believe a supposedly third world country like Brazil has figured out something better than them and they're lashing out against us.
In the meantime, we literally meme about america and how long it takes, and the absolute vast majority of the people trust the system even if they don't understand it. Only folks that don't...are THOSE kind of people.
Second, it don't give to you because we had something here called "coronelismo", we high power guys put people in front of voting stations for seeing if you vote for the right politician
So its REALLY important here the concept of secret voting and not having on you the vote
O que ele tá dizendo é que o comprovante do voto é impresso e a pessoa vê, mas ela não tem acesso à esse papel, não fica com ela. Portanto os votos individuais podem ser contados. No Brasil vc tem os totais por urna, é diferente.
No fim das contas, esse proposta de voto impresso que a pessoa vê dentro de uma capa de plástico transparente é a mesma coisa do boletim de urna que já existe.
A validação do voto é digital, com biometria, e embaralhada pra ninguém saber quem votou em quem. A operação ainda é "usuário u/st945 votou > candidato X recebeu +1 voto". Depois disso, embaralha pra não saber que foi você quem deu +1 no candidato X.
Adicionar um papel impresso no meio do caminho destrói a premissa secreta do voto. Uma coisa é você sair dizendo que votou em tal, outra é o sistema ter essa informação. Eu posso dizer pra todo mundo que votei 22, mas, na realidade, só eu e Deus sabemos que votei 13, por exemplo.
Umas das funções de segurança da urna é embaralhar a ordem dos votos. Se os votos fossem listados na ordem em que ocorreram, alguém poderia só registrar a ordem da fila e saber exatamente em quem cada pessoa votou. Já se sai um bilhete impresso com o voto, um por um, é uma forma de saber a ordem dos votos. Essa também é uma razão para não se ter o comprovante saindo ali na hora.
That's good there's a paper trail. Voting is secret in the US too. You go to your booth and only you see the printout before it's sealed. What is important is that there's physical backup not that anyone else sees it
The physical backup for the person is the problem, exactly because of coercion
This is because of the wealth inequality that we have. People got fired and even killed because of the vote because powerful people having access to their vote
It was like what trump want to do in the mid terms with ice on steroids
How do they tie it back to you? Our paper copies do not have your name on it, they are sealed before being handed in, then they are put into a locked box.
In the opinion of many, coronelismo is still real in many small communities whose economics are all commanded by the same powerful people. If the people in power have access to even the average votes issued by that community, which is possible specially in small municipalities and in city-wide elections, the entire community is at mercy of the actions of those that control resource influx and infrastructure within the community itself.
So, Brazil has some weird corruption thing. As a brazillian, I know that if you had access to the paper, politicians (the more criminal ones, specially in small town), would demand you leave the votting place WITH the paper proving you voted on him.
Now, if the paper never actually can be "taken" by the person (but briefly checked, i.e. behind a protective glass), then I believe it would be useful.
Otherwise we are back at the "buying votes" era (not even buying, just harrassing people, either with violence or excessive buroucracy when you need anything from the city).
Last time I voted I remember the machine printed it out and I would seal it and put it in a box, but previously I voted on a different kind of machine in a different city in California, and that one printed out the ballot, you could see it through a plastic window, and after you accept it and confirm it's correct, it would be deposited into the machine in a locked compartment. You never actually handled the paper. I believe that would also solve the problem.
According to other comments here, Brazilian voting machines do have a paper trail, but I guess they aren't previewed to the voter? If corruption is so bad that you can be spied on even in a private booth then I suppose that would be necessary. Plus you need to trust the machine either way. Like the machine I used I still need to trust that the paper copy went into the correct locked compartment and there isn't a secret identifier and that it was transported faithfully, so you need to trust the machine either way. The paper trail is less proof to the voter and instead a log for auditors.
But if they can spy on you in a private booth they can see who you selected whether it's on paper or on a screen.
No. The voting is purely electronic. Individual votes aren't printed to paper.
The paper trail that is produced is (essentially):
the zerissima: a printed "partial" from the machine BEFORE voting stars - this print should read 0 votes for every candidate. If not, the machine is invalidated and another one put in its place.
the final result from the machine, with the total number of votes for each candidate as well as nullified and empty votes.
So, again, there is no actual printed "prove" for each individual vote, only for the total sum of each machine.
Now imagine this: a physical bag with all the printed votes for each machine. The integrity of each individual bag is a hard to secure feature and "easier" to violate than it is the digital security of the current machines. So, if someone would violate the bags, put in or remove votes, and somehow managed to challenge the results from the machine, the two most probable outcomes would be to nullify the results from that voting session, or ignore the digital results and use the printed one. But the digital ones are actually safer and less susceptible to manipulation with the current system than physical ones.
You could argue that the digital results could be easily manipulated "en mass", at large numbers, but this is also not true, because the machines and drives can be audited after the election, and the actual results are the compilation of all machines, for which we have printed "proofs" of before and after. So it is absolutely possible to check if there has been manipulation, and it is possible to find where it happened in the chain, before AND AFTER the election.
This doesn't prevent manipulation at individual voting stations by fraudulent voting or voting under coercion, or even prevent people from voting in districts you know your "candidate" has a disadvantage, nor would it guarantee that auditions would happen if a dishonest government is in place and attempt tô manipulate the election.
I don't necessarily think a per vote paper trail is absolutely necessary, but I do think a paper trail is. I was giving the California system as an example. Something to cross reference for audits is important, which Brazil's system does have.
Fuck paper trail. We had in Brazil a long history of shenanigans involving paper ballots, and we should never go back to that, including paper trail. A paper trail only means you now have a bunch of paper that can disappear or be manipulated, generating unnecessary risk for the election.
The problem with printed paper trail is that it can introduce secret stenography to indicated who voted whom and when, which violates the secrecy of the vote.
That's exactly the same case with a purely electronic voting machine. You prevent it from identifying you by making it so it doesn't know who you are period. You have two ledgers, one that simply records whether you voted, then another that records the vote without knowing who voted, and the number of votes need to match the number of people who were confirmed to have voted.
It doesn't matter if you print it out or store it in a hard drive, they are just different storage mediums for the same data. To make it secure what matters is what data is stored, not the medium it's stored on
Um dos pilares da democracia é o voto ser sercreto. Muitas pessoas iriam comercializar o voto caso tivesse alguma prova de quem ela votou. Que é o que ocorre nos EUA. Com o Trump dizendo que vai dar 5k em quem votar nele. Tem burro para tudo.
There are paper-printed, anonymous ballots in my location in the US. It prints out a piece of paper with your choices on it but not your name. Most of the tallying is done with the electronic machines with risk-limiting audits on paper ballots.
Isso explica muito sobre o porque a democracia dos EUA é uma piada. Emfim, as urnas eletronicas sao eficientes a ponto de você nao precisar se arriscar levando consigo um comprovante de voto.
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u/Fidodo 11h ago
I'm fine with electronic voting machines with the requirement that they also produce a printed paper trail so they can be audited in case something seems off. Electronic voting machines in California print to paper and your can validate that your paper printout matches before you submit it.